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TAKING NATURE INTO ACCOUNT: OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE
CHANGING ROLE OF ANALYSIS AND NEGOTIATION IN
HYDROPOWER RE-LICENSING
KURT STEPHENSON*
Between the years 2000 and 2010, hydroelectric projects
representing approximately twenty percent of the nation's installed
hydroelectric generating capacity will be applying for new operating
licenses.' These hydropower projects are operated by private and
municipal (nonfederal) operators, and do not include federal hydropower
projects operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau of
Reclamation, or the Tennessee Valley Authority. The conditions under
which nonfederal hydropower projects must operate are determined by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).2 Under the Federal
Power Act, the FERC is granted authority to authorize the construction of
a hydropower facility on the waters of the United States.3 The FERC can
issue operating licenses for up to fifty years, and the terms of the license
cannot be changed except by mutual consent. a A license contains the
conditions by which a dam must operate and may include requirements for
minimum downstream flows, fish passage issues (fish ladders and
* Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Virginia Tech,
Blacksburg, Virginia. Support for this research was provided by the National Science
Foundation, Project #SBR-9815472.
I See Douglas W. Smith, General Counsel of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Testimony before the Energy and Power Committee on Commerce, U.S.
House of Representatives, Sept. 25, 1998, at 10. Currently, nonfederal hydropower
projects produce over five percent of the nation's electric power generation. Nonfederal
hydroelectric projects produce a little more than half of the nation's total hydropower
output.
2 Originally the FERC was called the Federal Power Commission. The name of the
Commission changed in 1977. See Pub. L. No. 91-95, 91 Stat. 565 (1977). See also 42
U.S.C. § 7171 (1977).
3 The FERC's powers to regulate hydropower development were initially established
under the 1920 Federal Water Power Act (Federal Water Power Act of 1920, Pub. L. No.
66-280, § 1, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920)). The current version of the act can be found at 16
U.S.C. §§ 791(a) - 828(c) (2000). The FERC regulates over 1,600 hydropower projects
at over 2,000 dams under the FPA. See Smith, supra note 1, at 2.
4 See 16 U.S.C. § 799.
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screens), and access to and creation of recreational activities.5 The FERC
also reissues licenses when the original license expires.
6
The large number of hydropower licenses coming up for renewal
in the next ten years is generating widespread general interest over how
these existing dams will be operated in the future.7 Uncertainties,
conflicting interests and values, and complex trade-offs characterize a
relicensing case.8 Consider a short sample of these issues that might be
encountered in a relicensing case. A hydroelectric project typically
generates electricity at a fraction of the cost of a conventional thermal
project (typically the lowest cost alternative). 9 Furthermore, the electricity
is clean relative to other energy sources.10  Hydropower generates
electricity without producing air emissions associated with fossil fuels
(particulates, sulfur dioxides, nitrogen oxides, and greenhouse gases, for
example), and without the long-term disposal problems and costs
associated with nuclear power. 1 If the project has substantial water
storage capacity, the project provides one of the few practical means to
5 See 16 U.S.C. § 803; 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.41, 4.51 (2000).
6 See 16 U.S.C. § 808.
7See John McPhee, Farewell to the Nineteenth Century, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 27,
1999, at 44; Andrew Murr, A River Runs Through It, NEWSWEEK, July 12, 1999, at 46;
Marc Reisner, Coming Undammed, AUDUBON, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 58. The Hydropower
Reform Coalition was formed in 1992 to influence the course and direction of a bulk of
licensing renewals that were scheduled for 1993. See American Rivers, Hydropower
Reform Coalition, at http://amrivers.localweb.com/abouthrc.html. The Coalition is made
up of national, state and local conservation organizations with the intention of improving
the ecological conditions on rivers dammed by nonfederal hydropower projects. See id.
8 See generally James M. Fargo, Evaluating the Economics of Hydroelectric Projects at
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Office of Hydropower Relicensing, Paper No. DPR-1, Sept. 1989; Muff, supra note 7, at
46.
9 See Richard L. Mittelstadt, Determining Hydro Project Dependable Capacity, in
WATERPOWER '89: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
HYDROPOWER 38, 39 (American Society of Civil Engineers eds., 1989); Fargo, supra
note 8; see also Daniel D. Huppert, Snake River Salmon Recovery: Quantifying the Costs,
CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 476 (1999).
10 See BEN W. EBENHACK, ENERGY RESOURCES: AVAILABILITY, USE, AND IMPACT 278-
79 (1995).
11 See id. at 278-79; Hermond Brekke, Environmentalism and Hydropower, Paper
presented at the conference Hydro's Future: Technology, Markets, and Policy,
Hydropower '99 (June 6-9, 1999). For a summary of environmental issues associated
with hydropower production, see Michael T. Pyle, Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal
as a Strategy for Restoring America 's Rivers, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (1995).
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store electricity on a large scale.12 Such projects are able to provide power
almost instantaneously at times of peak energy demand, helping prevent
brownouts and power outages.' 3  Early experience with deregulation
reveals that the premium paid for peaking power can be significant. 4 The
reservoir behind the dam may provide ancillary benefits in terms of flood
protection, water supply, navigation, and recreation.
15
At the same time, the operation of a hydro project can severely
disrupt the riparian environment.1 6  Hydropower projects alter the fish
composition by blocking fish migrations and altering the flow and
temperature of water downstream.' Barriers to migration have been
identified as either contributing to the decline, or blocking recovery of,
such migratory fish species as salmon, shad, and sturgeon. 8 Higher
instream flows increase oxygen content and the water pollution dilution
capacity downstream, making it easier for water quality managers to
achieve water quality standards and lower the costs to society of treating
wastewater discharges. 19 Fluctuations in downstream flow from peaking
operations can also disrupt riparian ecosystem functioning and terrestrial
wildlife inhabiting the riparian zone.20 Dewatering of the by-pass reaches
12 See EBENHACK, supra note 10, at 131-33.
13 See id.
14 See Edward Fulton, Electric Industry Restructuring in North America: A Status
Report, HYDRO REv., Apr. 2000, at 10; Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, Electricity
Restructuring: Deregulation or Reregulation?, 23 REG. 46, 49 (2000).
15 See generally Huppert, supra note 9; Terry H. Morlan, A Note on the Role of
Economics in Pacific Northwest Salmon Policy, NORTHWEST J. OF BUS. & EcON. 1
1999).
6 See Pyle, supra note 10, at 103.
1 7 See id. at 103-04.
18 See id.
19 See John S. Crossman & Richard J. Ruane, Watershed-based Pollutant Trading
Involving Hydropower Projects: Mississippi River Basin, Paper presented at the
conference Hydro's Future: Technology, Markets, and Policy, Hydropower '99
Conference (July 6-9, 1999).
20 For example, instream flow management of dams along the Platte River are thought to
be important factors influencing habitat of the Sandhill and Whooping cranes. See John
Echeverria, The Limits of Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management: The
Case of the Platte River, Address at the Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. Symp.,
Water Rights and Watershed Management: Planning for the Future (Mar. 31, 2000); Alan
D. Mitchnick, Hydropower Relicensing and Endangered Species: Potential Conflicts and
Opportunities in the New Millennium, Paper presented at the conference Hydro's Future:
Technology, Markets, and Policy, Hydropower '99 (July 6-9, 1999).
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and low flow conditions below the dam adversely impact downstream
recreational opportunities. 21
At the limit, the dam itself could be removed.22  Many
nongovernmental groups are increasingly calling for the FERC to consider
dam decommissioning and removal as a serious alternative in a relicensing
case.23 Yet, removing a dam can be an extremely expensive option, not
only in terms of lost low cost power, but in terms of the cost of physically
removing the dam.24  In addition, dam removal is not a completely
positive environmental action for the riparian ecosystem. Dam removal
itself can impose significant costs on the environment in terms of releasing
decades worth of sediment trapped behind the dam itself.26 Environmental
benefits in terms of aquatic restoration may in turn take years to be
realized because of the sediment flushing process that needs to occur.27
Even then, there may be uncertainty about how native species will respond
to new riparian conditions. 28
21 Water flow in by-pass reaches is a common concern in many FERC licensing cases.
For a sample of the issues, see generally Lydia T. Grimm, Fishery Protection and FERC
Hydropower Relicensing Under ECPA: Maintaining a Deadly Status Quo, 20 ENVTL. L.
929 (1990).
22See generally Hydropower Reform Coalition, Policy on Applied Science in the FERC
Relicensing Process, at http://amrivers.localweb.con/science.html.
23 See id.
24Estimates of removing the two hydropower dams on the Elwha river range from $111
to $127 million. See National Park Service, Elwha River Ecosystem Restoration
Implementation: Summary of Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Apr. 1996), athttp://www.nps.gov/planning/olym/drftsun/elwha.htn. For a summary of the Elwha
debate, see Phillip M. Bender, Restoring the Elwha, White Salmon, and Rogue Rivers: A
Comparison of Dam Removal Proposals in the Pacific Northwest, 17 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 189 (1997). See also Huppert, supra note 9.25 See National Park Service, supra note 24.
26 See id.; see also American Rivers, Friends of the Earth, and Trout Unlimited, Dam
Removal Success Stories (Dec. 1999), at http://www.tu.org/library/conservation/drss.pdf.
27 See National Park Service, supra note 24; see also Pyle, supra note 10, at 113-14.
28See Morlan, supra note 15, at 14. Besides the existence of a hydro power facility,Huppert notes that fish response is also dependent on habitat conditions, fish harvest, and
hatchery production. See Huppert, supra note 9, at 478-79. Dam removal may alone
achieve fish recovery efforts. On July 20, 2000, the Clinton administration announced
opposition to removing four federal power projects on the lower Snake River in part
because dam removal "may not be essential... and probably would not be sufficient" toimprove salmon numbers. Cat Lazaroff, White House Opposes Removing Snake River
Dams, ENV'T NEWS SERVICE (July 20, 2000), at http://ens.lycos.com/ ens/jul2000/2000L-
07-20-06.html (quoting the chairman of the White House Council on Environmental
Quality).
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Obviously, defining new dam operating conditions requires
choices among competing ends, interests, and values. The terms of a
license or the denial of a license requires choices between plainly
economic considerations (low cost power) and environmental ones (higher
instream flows). Stabilizing and increasing downstream flow and
providing fish passage facilities undermines the economic viability and
attractiveness of a project by reducing power production. Yet the choice
of license conditions also involves choices between competing
environmental outcomes (adverse changes in air quality from burning
more fossil fuels versus improved riparian conditions). Finally,
recreational interests may conflict. For example, stable reservoir levels
that would be favored by reservoir property owners and anglers may
conflict with the desire for minimum variations in seasonal instream flow
favored by downstream boaters, anglers, and property owners.
Given these competing ends, how should nature be taken into
account in the relicensing decision? In other words, how should society
decide between these competing ends, interests, and values? The criticism
and dissatisfaction of the FERC relicensing process is intensifying, by
both the assessments of the hydropower industry and environmental
groups. This paper explores the changing role of analysis and negotiation
in making decisions about the future use of our river systems in
hydropower relicensing. While the relicensing process appears to have
entered a period of intense scrutiny and change, tentative predictions are
made here about how the decision process will evolve to account for the
many environmental and economic consequences of hydropower
relicensing. These tentative predictions are developed in four sections.
Section one identifies two conceptual models of decision-making that
could be used to make choices between competing ends. The role of
professional analysis and analysts in each of these conceptual frameworks
is discussed. The second section describes the FERC's historical decision-
making approach and the type of analysis used to decide the conditions in
a relicensing case. The third section summarizes the new pressures for
change and reform of the relicensing process. The final section analyzes
how these pressures are changing the FERC decision process. I conclude
the paper with a tentative conclusion that while the processes used to
decide how to take nature into account in relicensing decisions will
continue to change, the underlying analysis that supports the decision
process will not.
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I. CONCEPTUAL DECISION-MAKING FRAMEwoRKs
A relicensing decision-process must decide questions such as:
" How will dam operating and management possibilities be
revealed and discovered?
* How will the decision process ensure that all parties with an
interest or stake in the outcome are properly represented
(including environmental ones)?
* How will tremendous economic and biological uncertainties be
addressed?
* How will trade-offs between competing environmental,
economic, and recreational ends be made?
What process will decide these questions? Conceptually, at least
two approaches to decision-making can be imagined. These two
approaches-labeled here the rational analytic and political negotiation
approaches-are not meant to represent reality but to merely portray two
broad, stylized, and normative views of the way a process should answer
these questions.
A rational analytic approach would create systems of structured
analysis and a corresponding set of decision rules that would guide
decisions about dam operations. The rational analytic approach begins
with a limited number of decision participants that follow a formal
decision logic.2 9  These participants conceptually identify objectives,
formulate alternatives to meet those objectives, evaluate the consequences
of each alternative, develop procedures to weigh the many different
consequences and then choose an alternative based on some a priori
decision criteria. Formal rules and procedures would be devised that
would identify the rules of analysis that would evaluate, weigh, and
choose between competing alternatives. 31 These rules would provide the
basis for an "objective" analysis and identify the "best" answers to the
above questions. 2
29 See generally CHARLES LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 21 (1965)
thereinafter LINDBLOM, INTELLIGENCE].
This formal rational analytic process has been described by many others. See, e.g.,
LINDBLOM, INTELLIGENCE, supra note 29; GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, EVIDENCE,
ARGUMENT, AND PERSUASION IN THE POLICY PROCESS (1989); James G. March, Theories
of Choice and Making Decisions, 20 SOC'Y, Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 29.31 See March, supra note 30, at 29.
32 See id.
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One manifestation of the rational analytic approach is formal
benefit-cost analysis advocated by many economists and policy analysts.
33
Formal rules of conducting analysis are derived from mainstream
microeconomic (welfare economic) theory.34 Benefits and costs are, at the
conceptual level, a measure of the different preferences people hold for the
policy alternatives under consideration. 35 Benefit-cost analysis rests on
the argument that the choices individuals make in market exchange
provide the data that analysts can use to translate people's preferences into
money terms.36 The logic of the argument is straightforward. In a market
exchange money income is sacrificed (a price is paid) in order to secure
some good or service. By arguing that preferences guide market choices,
analysts conclude that the money value of a good or service is at least
equal to the amount of income a person spends to obtain the service.37
Thus, market prices are the raw data for preference measurement. The
often explicit premises of this revealed choice framework are that
individuals know their preferences for goods and services (states of the
world) before being confronted with a choice, that people are willing to
pay to satisfy those preferences, and whatever an individual chooses is in
the interests of that individual. By monetizing the preferences people hold
for different alternatives in the form of willingness to pay, the analyst can
weigh competing alternatives in a common unit of measurement." The
criterion to select the best alternative is the one that generates the highest
net benefits (benefits less costs). 39
33 For a summary of this approach, see HANK C. JENKINS-SMITH, DEMOCRATIC POLITICS
AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1990). For one attempt to generalize how a benefit-cost analysis
software program can account for economic and environmental consequences of
relicensing, see generally DECISION FOCUS, INC., AWARE USER'S MANUAL (1991). For
a critique of the AWARE software, see John M. Bartholow et al., Balancing Hydropower
and Environmental Values: The Resource Management Implications of the US. Electric
Consumers Protection Act and the A WARE Software, 4 ENVTL. VALUES 257 (1995). It
should be pointed out that calls for a more analytical structure to make the licensing
decisions do not necessarily need to be for a benefit-cost analysis. See generally William
R. Stewart, Jr. & Evan R. Horowitz, Environmental Factor Weighting at the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 25 SOCIO-ECON. PLAN. & SCI. 123 (1991) (discussing
other proposed analytic decision processes).
34 See generally JENKINS-SMITH, supra note 33.
35 See id.
36 See id.37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See Hank Jenkins-Smith, supra note 33.
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Consider a hypothetical application of benefit-cost analysis to
determine instream flow requirements of a hydropower license. Suppose a
number of different instream flow regimes are being considered. The cost
of increasing downstream flow could include forgone peaking power and
less water for irrigation. Both consequences can be monetized given
existing market-derived information. Power costs are typically calculated
as the higher costs that must be incurred to produce power from the next
best available power source.40  Costs associated with forgone irrigation
use can be monetized by using information from water rights markets or
calculating reductions in farm incomes from lower water use. Estimating
the benefits of the mitigation alternative may be more challenging, but not
insurmountable. While the preferences for higher instream flow may not
be adequately revealed in market transactions, economists have responded
to this need by developing methods-called nonmarket valuation
techniques-to place monetary values on environmental amenities not
traded in markets.41 Nonmarket valuation techniques have been developed
and used to place dollar values on people's preferences for environmental
services stemming from changes in instream flow.42  For example,
economists have attempted to monetize changes in water quality,43
recreational opportunities," preservation of endangered species,45 fish
40 See Mittelstadt, supra note 9, at 39. The logic of this calculation is that electricity
producers would conceptually be willing to pay up to the difference in power rates to
retain the hydroelectric source of power.
41 These methods include contingent valuation, travel cost, and hedonic price methods.
The literature on nonmarket valuation is voluminous. For an overview of these methods,
see Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J.
OF ECON. LITERATURE 675, 700-21 (1992). For an easily accessible summary of the
various methods and examples of how they have been applied to a variety of
environmental services, see Dennis King & Marisa Mazzotta, Ecosystem Valuation, at
www.ecosystemvaluation.org.
42 See John B. Loomis, Estimating the Public's Values for Instream Flow: Economic
Techniques and Dollar Values, 34 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 1007 (1998).
43 See Christopher G. Leggett & Nancy E. Bockstael, Evidence of the Effects of Water
Quality on Residential Land Prices, 39 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 121 (2000); V.
KERRY SMITH & WILLIAM H. DESvOUSGES, MEASURING WATER QUALITY BENEFITS
986).
See A. Myrick Freeman, III, The Benefits of Water Quality Improvements for Marine
Recreation: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 10 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 385(1995); National Wildlife Federation, Wet, Wild, and Profitable: A Report on the
Economic Value of Water-Based Recreation in Vermont (Feb. 1997), at http://www.nwf.
org/northeastern/resources/wetwild.html; Jonathan G. Taylor & Aaron J. Douglas,
Diversifying Natural Resources Value Measurements: The Trinity River Study, 12 Soc. &
NAT. RESOURCES 315 (1999).
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populations,46 habitat,47 and aesthetics. 48 Once the costs and benefits are
calculated for each alternative, the instream flow alterative that generates
the highest net benefits is selected.
Advocates of the rational analytic approach say it is the best way to
systematically and rationally decide between competing ends.49  This
support is buttressed by contempt of "irrational" decisions made in a
political process.50 Advocates for the rational analytic approach fear that
decisions made in a political process are subject to capture by narrow
interest-group politics.5' The political system is subject to control and
disproportionate influence by the economically powerful parties.52  In
hydropower relicensing, this sentiment may be reflected in a general
feeling that nature cannot compete against financially powerful
hydropower interests in the political arena. In the rational analytic model,
it is the analysts, with their formal analytical rules, that will consider and
45 See James Bowker & John R. Stoll, Use of Dichotomous Choice Nonmarket Methods
to Value the Whooping Crane Resource, 70 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 372 (1988); Kevin J.
Boyle & Richard C. Bishop, Valuing Wildlife in Benefit-Cost Analyses: A Case Study
Involving Endangered Species, 23 WATER RESOURCES RES. 943 (1987).
46 See John B. Loomis, Measuring the Economic Benefits of Removing Dams and
Restoring the Elwha River: Results of a Contingent Valuation Survey, 32 WATER
RESOURCES RES. 441 (1996).
47 See John B. Loomis et al., Measuring the Total Economic Value of Restoring
Ecosystem Services in an Impaired River Basin: Results from a Contingent Valuation
Survey, 33 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 103 (2000).
48 See Mark Rockel & Mary Jo Kealy, The Value of Nonconsumptive Wildlife Recreation
in the United States, 67 LAND ECON. 422 (1991).
49 See generally EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY
ANALYSIS 134 (1978).
50 See id. at 151.
51 See id.
52 According to one well-known text:
[o]ne of the great virtues of the benefit-cost approach ... is that the
interests of individuals who are poorly organized or less closely
involved are counted. (This contrasts with most political decision
making procedures.) Even when pushed by powerful interest groups,
projects whose benefits do not outweigh their costs will be shown to be
undesirable. The benefits and costs accruing to all-to the highway
builders, the environmentalists, the 'little people,' the users and
providers of services, the taxpaying public-will be counted on a
dollar-for-dollar basis. Benefit-cost analysis is a methodology with
which we pursue efficiency and which has the effect of limiting the
vagaries of the political process.
Id. at 151.
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take into account the preferences people have for nature.53 Hank Jenkins-
Smith-a student of the role of policy analysis in public decision-
making--describes the rationale for the rational analytic approach as:
optimistic; it promises to improve the mapping of
individual preferences into policy---encompassing the
preferences of the "little guy" as well as those of the well-
financed political lobby. In the tradition of Western
liberalism, this form of decision making would rely more
on the expressions of individual citizens and less on
political representatives. The techniques of analysis would
play a central role in collection and aggregation of
individual preferences, and therefore, the information and
advice of the analyst would become crucial and influential
in the policy-making process. 54
Nature, according to the rational analytic model, is best taken into account
by allowing analysts to measure and weigh people's preferences for
alternatives. 5
5
An alternative model, called here the political negotiation
approach, relies on bargaining processes to reach decisions.56 Advocates
of this approach view negotiation as an interactive process in which
people revise and discover their preferences, discover and create
alternatives, and better understand the outcomes of alternative policies.57
53 See generally JENKINS-SMITH, supra note 33, at 1.
54 See id. at 39.
55 The rationale for greater use of placing money values on environmental amenities is to
ensure that people whose preferences are not often considered or heard in a political
negotiation are taken into account. See, e.g., STOKEY, supra note 49. See also Katharine
K. Baker, Consorting with Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to Natural Resources
and How We Should Value Their Loss, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677, 723 (1995).
56 Charles Lindblom is one of the most thoughtful and articulate proponents of this
general approach. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, INQUIRY AND CHANGE (1990)
[hereinafter LINDBLOM, INQUIRY]; LINDBLOM, INTELLIGENCE, supra note 29. For a
discussion of the philosophical perspective of this approach, see Mark Sagoff, On the
Value of Endangered and Other Species, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 897 (1996). For an example
of congressional support of increased use of negotiation in environmental decision-
making, see Margaret L. Claibome, Regulation by Consensus: The Expanded Use of
Regulatory Negotiation Under the Clean Air Act, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 44
t1996).
7 See generally LINDBLOM, INQUIRY, supra note 56; LINDBLOM, INTELLIGENCE, supra
note 29, at 320-323.
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In this view, political negotiation is not just a power play of participants
with well-defined preferences among known alternatives, but serves a
valuable role in utilizing diverse and diffuse knowledge. 58 Giandomenico
Majone argues that:
persuasion is a two-way interchange, a method of mutual
learning through discourse. Real debate not only lets the
participants promote their own views and interests, but also
encourages them to adjust their views of reality and even to
change their values as a result of the process.
59
This perspective, in general, begins with the premise that there are
severe limits on the ability of any one human mind, or small group of
minds, to know and evaluate diverse alternatives.60 Thus, people holding
this perspective are critical of the rational analytic approach, since the
analytic approach vests power and decision-making authority in the hands
of unelected analysts and experts. 61 Creating open forums of negotiation
in which a wide array of partisan participants can participate is a better
method of making use of dispersed, fragmented knowledge and
accommodating diverse sets of interests.62
This position does not necessarily mean analysis plays no role in
the negotiation process. Analysis is critical to the negotiation process, but
it is not the same kind of analysis present in the rational analytic approach.
Analysis is not identified and generated a priori, based on formal analytic
rules. Rather, the type of analysis being performed is selected and
identified by the participants of the negotiation in order to clarify trade-
offs and clarify and reveal opportunities. 63 Analytical needs evolve as the
58 See generally supra note 56.
5 9 See MAJONE, supra note 30, at 8.60 See id. at 9.
61 See id. at 12.
62 See id. at 9-20.
63 It should be stressed that this view does not propose that analysis should be used as the
basis for settling conflicts between conflicting interests and values. Participants in a
political negotiation ultimately need to decide between competing interests and values.
Helen Ingram and Anne Schneider effectively argue that in many cases contemporary
water policy (political negotiation) suffers when fundamental trade-offs between
competing values are framed as technical questions that can be answered by additional
analysis. Ingram and Schneider write "for every water resource question settled by an
elite, an important opportunity to improve the deliberative process is forgone . . .
scientists have credibility to more convincingly draw the boundaries between what
experts need to address and what should be public issues." Helen Ingram & Anne
2000]
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course of the negotiations changes. New attempts are now being made to
think differently about the way analysis can facilitate negotiations. 64
These attempts are aimed at fostering greater two-way communication
between professional analysts and decision participants, not in a way that
purports to provide the "answer," but in a way that will facilitate and
advance mutual understanding. 65  Finally, analysis may not always be
formal, quantitative analysis. Effective, credible, and illuminating inquiry
can be qualitative and based on the experience, analogies, and informal
knowledge of lay participants.66
II. THE HISTORICAL FERC DECISION PROCESS
The conceptual models of decision-making just described reflect
simplified perspectives on the way public decisions should be made.
Arguably, the FERC hydropower licensing process has much in common
with the rational analytic perspective. The statutory delegation of
authority to the FERC to determine how a public resource will be used
drew intellectual support from a progressive-era faith in expertise and
rational scientific management. The FERC was established as an
independent commission.67 As an independent commission, the FERC
would determine what the public interest was in dam licensing decisions
and could do so based on sound technical studies and insulated from
political pressure. Even by standards of the day, the FERC was better
insulated from public pressure than most water resource agencies. With a
few exceptions, Congress granted the FERC broad and sweeping authority
to decide whether a dam would be constructed and the conditions in which
Schneider, Science, Democracy, and Water Policy, 113 WATER RESOURCES UPDATE 21,
27 (Autumn 1999). In short, many political negotiations are dysfunctional because of too
little political decision-making and too much reliance on analysis. See id.
64 See Institute for Water Resources, Shared Vision Planning, at http://www.wrsc.
usace.anny.mil/iwr/Planning/svp.pdf.
65 See, e.g., id. This approach requires both the professional analyst and lay decision
participant to jointly conduct analytical studies, so that they can better understand both
the trade-offs they face and the limitations of analysis.
66 For a discussion of the importance of informal inquiry, see generally LINDBLOM,
INQUIRY, supra note 56.
67 Initially, the Federal Power Commission consisted of the Secretaries of War, Interior,
and Agriculture plus three other term members. See Federal Water Power Act of 1920,
Pub. L. No. 66-280, § 1, 41 Stat. 1063, 1063 (1920). In 1930, Congress changed the
membership of the Commission to five commissioners appointed by the President. See
16 U.S.C. § 792 (1994).
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the dam should operate.68 According to David Spence, "for more than
[sixty] years the FPA has been the prototypical example of the
unconstrained delegation of power to unelected bureaucrats.
69
Congress did not explicitly instruct the FERC to approve and
promote hydropower, although this was clearly an important rationale for
passage of FPA.70  From the beginning, the FERC was instructed to
balance competing uses and select those "best adapted to a comprehensive
scheme of improvement and utilization for the purposes of navigation, of
water-power development, and of other beneficial uses.' Appointed
commissioners and staff analysts were were responsible for determining
what was best adapted, beneficial, and in the public interest.
As the original thirty to fifty year licenses expire, the FERC must
revisit the license conditions in which a dam operates. What type of
analysis did the FERC use to decide what will be required of these
existing dams? The analytical process that has emerged in the relicensing
process was not based on a comprehensive balancing of benefits and costs
of alternatives as envisioned by economists and according to the rules of
welfare economic analysis.72 Rather, the FERC analyses can best be
described as "knee-of-the-curve cost analysis."
The general analytic process the FERC uses can be described in
the following way.73  First, the FERC approached the dam relicensing
68 See Beth C. Bryant, FERC's Dam Decommissioning Authority Under the Federal
Power Act, 74 WASH. L. REv. 95, 103 (1999).
69 David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative
Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413,420 (1999).
See Katharine Costenbader, Damning Dams: Bearing the Cost of Restoring America's
Rivers, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 635, 646 (1998). For a history of the passage of the
Federal Water Power Act, see JEROME G. KERWIN, FEDERAL WATER-POWER
LEGISLATION (1926).
71 Pub. L. No. 66-280, § 10 (1), 41 Stat. 1063, 1068 (1920). In 1935, Congress
specifically amended the Federal Water Power Act to require the commission to consider
"recreational purposes." Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935). See generally Charles
R. Sensiba, Who's in Charge Here? The Shrinking Role of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission in Hydropower Relicensing, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 603 (1999).
72 In other areas of the nation's water programs, there exists a long history of
development of benefit-cost guidelines and use of benefit-cost analysis. For instance, the
Water Resources Coucil sets bounds on how benefit-cost analysis works for federal water
projects. See United States Water Resources Council, Economic and Environmental
Principles Guidelines for Water and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies, at
http://www.wrsc.usace.army.mil/iwr/pdf/p&g.pdf.
73 James M. Fargo, Evaluating Relicense Proposals at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of Hydropower
Relicensing, Paper No. DPR-2, Apr. 1991; See also Fargo, supra note 8. Although Fargo
2000] 485
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
decision similar to an investment decision. If the current licensee wished
to renew a license, a new license would be granted.74  This approach
eliminated the need for FERC staff to seriously examine dam removal as a
mitigation alternative. Given that a new license would be issued, the
FERC analytic process was directed at balancing mitigation alternatives
between the economic interests of the licensee and the public's use of the
water resource. Thus, the license process concerned the determination of
what new operating conditions would be placed in the new license.
Formal and informal knee-of-the-curve cost analysis and logic was
applied to strike a balance between economic and environmental ends.75
Knee-of-the-curve analysis begins by calculating the cost of a number of
mitigation alternatives. The mitigation alternatives are ordered in a range
from no mitigation to the most extensive (and expensive) mitigation
option. Mitigation alternatives are written into a license as long as the
additional cost of the alternative is small relative to the environmental
gains.
To illustrate knee-of-the-curve logic, suppose there are four
different downstream flow regimes being considered-100, 200, 300, and
400 cubic feet per second ("cfs"). The FERC analysts calculate the cost of
each alternative as the value of the forgone power of each flow regime.76
The potential consequences of each flow regime, in terms of recreational
activities or wildlife enhancement, are then considered. These "benefits"
are not typically translated into dollar values, but instead are expressed in
natural units or qualitative judgments. 77 Instream flow would be increased
as long as the costs were small relative to potential gains downstream. For
example, suppose increasing instream flow from 100 cfs to 200 cfs
increases spawning runs of anadromous fish species by 1,000 adults and
does not use "knee-of-the-curve" language to describe FERC analysis, the phrase
accurately reflects the FERC's published description of the analytical decision process.
74 See Pyle, supra note 10, at 106; see also Spence, supra note 69, at 434.
75 See generally Fargo, supra note 73.
76 See generally id.
77 Examples include habitat equivalency measures, changes in fish populations, or
number of recreational user days. One review of FERC decisions failed to find a single
monetized benefit estimate in a sample of nineteen FERC analyses. See Michael R.
Moore et al., Testing Theories of Agency Behavior: Evidence from Hydropower Project
Relicensing Decisions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Address at the
Allied Social Science Association (Jan. 3-5, 1998) (manuscript on file with WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv.). See also David Marcus, FERC's Economic Analysis of
Hydro Projects: A Review of Policy and Practice Since the Mead Decision (Mar. 18,
1997) (manuscript prepared for the Hydropower Reform Coalition on file with the WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv.).
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costs $5,000 in lost power benefits. Further increasing stream flow from
200 cfs to 300 cfs may again increase the number of returning fish by
1,000, but cost $10,000 in lost power benefits. However, increasing
stream flow from 300 to 400 cfs may increase the number of fish by 1,000
but cost $100,000 in lost power benefits. In knee-of-the-curve analysis,
additional in-stream flow would be required until the incremental costs of
additional flow became high (sharply increasing cost is the "knee" on a
marginal cost curve) compared to the environmental gains. In this
hypothetical case, the incremental cost of a returning adult fish increases
sharply between 300 cfs to 400 cfs. In this case the FERC staff may
decide that the licensee should sacrifice $10,000 for an extra 1,000 fish,
but that $100,000 is too much to forgo for another 1,000 fish.7 8 The
FERC staff itself makes the judgment about whether the additional cost
was "worth" the additional environmental gain and not whether a benefit-
cost calculation reveals that it is "worth" it.
This analytic approach does not imply that bargaining and
negotiation are non-existent in the relicensing process. The FERC must
entertain and consider recommendations from federal and state agencies. 9
Such a structure required the FERC analysts to consider, debate and
negotiate with other agency experts about the consequences and relative
worth of the mitigation alternatives. In fact, the pattern of behavior in
licensing decisions clearly shows that the FERC accepted, or partially
accepted, a majority of the recommendations made by state and federal
wildlife and resource agencies regarding future dam operating
conditions. 80 But it was a rather narrow bargaining process in which the
FERC ultimately decided license conditions.
III. NEW PRESSURES FOR CHANGE
Almost since its inception, the FERC has been charged by some
with placing too much weight on hydropower interests in licensing and
78 This simple example makes the choice of tradeoffs appear more straightforward than is
typically the case. In actual relicensing cases, the ecological response to changes in
operating conditions (stream flow) exhibits a high degree of uncertainty and is subject to
considerable controversy.
79 For a summary of the traditional relicensing process, see Melissa Powell, A Case Study
for Stakeholders: An Alternative to Traditional Hydroelectric Relicensing, 18 ENERGY L.
J. 405, 406-409 (1997).
80 See Spence, supra note 69; Moore et al., supra note 77, at 10; see also General
Accounting Office, Electric Consumers' Protection Act's Effects on Licensing
Hydroelectric Dams (Sept. 1992), GAO/RCED-92-246.
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relicensing decisions.8 1 This criticism has strengthened and become more
vocal in the past two decades.82 Partly as a result of this criticism, the
FERC has seen a gradual erosion in its authority to determine licensing
conditions.8 3 In 1986, Congress passed the Electric Consumers Protection
Act (ECPA), which strengthened the balancing language in the Federal
Power Act.8 4  The ECPA also required the FERC to accept resource
agencies' recommendations or to explain in writing why it was rejecting
the suggested conditions.8 5 In 1992 Congress passed the Energy Policy
Act. Although the act was intended primarily to foster competition in the
electric utility industries, the act also expanded the authority of agencies in
the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to require fish passage facilities
in a FERC licensing case.
86
The courts have also expanded the authority of state and federal
agencies to override or dampen the FERC's authority to unilaterally
impose license conditions.8 7 For example, PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County
v. Washington Department of Ecology expanded state water quality
agencies' authority to specify downstream flow conditions in relicensing
81 See David B. Spence, Agency Discretion and the Dynamics of Procedural Reform, 59
PUB. ADMIN. REv. 425, 427 (1999).
82 See generally id.
83 See generally Sensiba, supra note 71.
84 Congress broadened the FERC's balancing requirements to selected projects best
adopted "for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, for the
adequate protection, mitigation and enhancement of fish and wildlife (including related
spawning grounds and habitat), and for other beneficial public uses, including irrigation,
flood control, water supply, and recreational and other purposes." 16 U.S.C.§ 803(a)(1)
(1994). 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) was also amended to explicitly require the FERC to "give
equal consideration to the purposes of energy conservation, the protection, mitigation of
damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds
and habitat), the protection of recreational opportunities, and the preservation of other
aspects of environmental quality." 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1994).
85 See 16 U.S.C.§ 7970) (1994). Procedurally, the FERC had to accept agency
recommendations or to explain in writing why it was rejecting the recommended
conditions. For a history of this section, see Grimm, supra note 21.
86 The Energy Policy Act "vacated a FERC regulation that narrowly interpreted the term
"fishway" in Section 18." Andrew H. Sawyer, Hydropower Relicensing in the Post Dam-
Building Era, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 12, 70 (Fall 1996). Section 18 (16 U.S.C. §
811) of the FPA states that the FERC "shall require the construction, maintenance, and
operation by a licensee at its own expense... such fishways as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce as appropriate." Prior to the
Energy Policy Act, the FERC had interpreted fish passage as providing upstream passage
but not downstream passage of resident fish.87 See generally PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
488 [Vol.25:473
TAKING NATURE INTO ACCOUNT
cases.88 One implication of PUD No. 1 is that states have greater latitude
to require dam operating conditions based on fish and wildlife needs,
recreation, and aesthetics.89
These changes and the increased attention relicensing decisions are
receiving from environmental groups and federal and state government
agencies are having noticeable consequences for the relicensing process.
Federal and state agencies have been more aggressive in asserting and
testing their conditioning authority in the relicensing process. 90 The
number of mitigation alternatives offered by agencies for each license is
increasing over time, and there has been a slight increase in probability
that the FERC writes these alternatives into a license. 91 Not surprisingly,
the license process has become more costly and conflict-ridden. 92
Consequently, the time to process a relicense request has increased
considerably. 93  A U.S. Department of Energy study indicated the
relicensing process took nine months to complete prior to 1986, three
years to complete in 1987, and over four to complete between 1994-96. 94
The consequences of these changes appear to be unsatisfying to
almost all parties with an interest in hydropower relicensing. The
hydropower industry is bitterly opposed to these developments, because it
sees the resource agencies' increasing influence in the licensing process as
driving up costs and undermining the FERC's congressional directive to
strike a balance between competing ends. The agencies are under no such
requirement to "balance." 95 As one voice for industry recently wrote: "As
currently constructed, the relicensing process lacks a central
comprehensive decision-making authority responsible for assessing and
balancing the important and often competing interests at play in
88 See id. at 711.
89 See Donald Clarke, Relicensing Hydropower: The Many Faces of Competition, 11
NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T. 8, 11 (Fall 1996); see also Sawyer, supra note 86, at 14-15.
90 See Sawyer, supra note 86; Sensiba, supra note 71.
91 Moore et al., supra note 77, at 24; GAO, supra note 80.
92 See National Hydropower Association, Why Hydropower Licensing Improvement is
Needed, at http://www.hydro.org/ga003.htm; see also Carol Ann Giovando, Hydro
Relicensing Jeopardizes Renewable Base, 144 POWER 66 (Jan.-Feb. 2000). See generally
Powell, supra note 79.
93 See generally RICHARD T. HUNT & JUDITH A. HUNT, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
HYDROPOWER RESOURCES AT RISK (1997).
94 See id.
95 See generally Sensiba, supra note 71. For a recent example of how mandatory
conditioning authority of a resource agency can make a project uneconomic to operate,
see Charlton H. Bonham, The Condit Dam Removal and Section 18 of the Federal Power
Act: A Coerced Settlement, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 97 (1999).
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relicensing." 96 Established patterns of FERC decision-making that allow
expectations to form over what mitigation alternatives FERC staff
consider "worth it" are changing. The perceived uncertainty of the
outcomes of the relicensing process is deeply unsettling to an industry
facing an increasingly competitive, deregulated environment.
For their part, environmental groups seem equally unsatisfied.
Groups like American Rivers and Trout Unlimited are increasingly vocal
and critical of the FERC's long-standing premise that a license will be
reissued.97 These voices are now calling for the decommissioning and
dam removal option to be considered as a serious alternative in every
relicensing case. 98 The dam removal option was almost never seriously
considered by even FERC critics as recently as fifteen years ago.99 In a
much discussed 1994 FERC policy statement, the FERC claimed it had the
authority to order dam decommissioning.100  In the same statement,
however, FERC commissioners stressed that such authority would only be
exercised in rare cases. 10 1  True to their word, the FERC has
decommissioned only one dam since the policy statement 10 2 and this
pattern of decisions continues to antagonize environmental groups. Even
if decommissioning is not authorized, there is a general feeling that
environmental services-"nature"--still do not receive enough weight in
determining operating conditions.'0 3 For many, the FERC, despite the
increasing authorities of federal and state resource agencies, still
inadequately reflects environmental concerns in decision-making and too
frequently decides against the recommendations of environmental groups
or federal and state agencies.'
0 4
96 Clarke, supra note 89, at 9.
97 See generally Hydropower Reform Coalition, Policy on Hydropower Dam
Decommissioning in the FERC Relicensing Process, December 1999, at http://amrivers.
localweb.com/brcdecom.html; see also Trout Unlimited, FERC Licensed Dams, at http://
www.tu.org/watch/ferc.html.
98 See Hydropower Reform Coalition, supra note 97.
99See Bender, supra note 24, at 197.
100 See FERC, Project Decommissioning at Relicensing: Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg.
339 (1995) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 2.24 (1997)).
101 See id.
102 Edwards Mfg. Co., 81 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,255 (Nov. 25,
1997).
103 See Sawyer, supra note 86, at 70. See generally Ted Williams, Freeing the Kennebec
River, 95 AUDUBON 36 (1993); John Simpson, Battle Looms Over Hydroelectric Dam
Relicensing, 8 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 50 (Apr. 15, 1993).
104 A large number of licenses were processed in 1993. See Smith, supra note 1, at 9.
The so-called class of '93 projects resulted in only a one percent reduction in total annual
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IV. SPECULATIONS ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF ANALYSIS AND NEGOTIATION
IN THE FERC RELICENSING PROCESS
Given so much dissatisfaction with the relicensing process, it is not
surprising that there have been calls of reform from all sides of the debate.
Some suggested reforms call for different analytical approaches, others
suggest a need for changes in the decision-making processes. What is
ultimately being debated is how nature will be taken into account in the
relicensing process of the future.
Some observers have proposed that the FERC needs to do a better
"analysis, ' 1°5 sometimes in the form of systematic benefit-cost analysis. 106
The implication is that the problem with the process is the analysis itself.
The argument seems to be that if the FERC would do a more
comprehensive benefit-cost analysis or do a better analysis, better
decisions would be made. With respect to taking into account nature's
services, the implication is that if analysts did a better job at quantifying
the benefits of environmental services, more interests (particularly
environmental ones) would be accounted for and better decisions made.
In short, nature would be better taken into account by analysis that
monetizes nature's services.
107
electricity generation from the previous licenses. See id. Grimm argues that FERC
commonly adopts the agency recommendation, but would delay implementation
indefinitely. See Grimm, supra note 21, at 946. For example, the FERC may require
submission of design drawings (often granting extensions) but places no requirements on
the date of completion.
105 See generally John R. Mohn, Baseline and Cumulative Impacts: FERC in Conflict,
Paper presented at the conference Hydro's Future: Technology, Markets, and Policy,
Hydropower '99 (June 6-9, 1999); see also Hydropower Reform Coalition, Hydropower
Reform Coalition Platform, Part II, at http://amrivers.localweb.com/platform.html;
Marcus, supra note 77.
106 See generally Marcus, supra note 77.
107 Environmental advocates sometimes conclude that monetization is necessary for
environmental services to compete on equal footing with market-oriented services. For
example, one highly publicized work that monetizes the value of the world's ecosystem
justifies the effort by stating: "Because ecosystem services are not fully 'captured' in
commercial markets or adequately quantified in terms comparable with economic
services and manufactured capital, they are often given too little weight in policy
decisions." Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and
Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 253 (1997). Similarly, one recent study asserted
"failure to quantify ecosystem values in commensurate terms with opportunity costs often
results in an implicit value of zero being placed on ecosystem services." See Loomis et
al., supra note 47, at 104.
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This reform fits squarely within the spirit of the independent
commission and the rational analytic approach. To date, this is a reform
that has not been embraced by the FERC. 10 8 While its authority has been
limited, the FERC has not significantly changed its approach to evaluating
alternatives. 10 9  The FERC still, as a general rule, fails to quantify
environmental changes in terms of dollars and continues to use knee-of-
the-curve logic to evaluate mitigation alternatives to an operating
facility. "1
0
Rather than altering its methods of analysis, the reform the FERC
has adopted is related to the process of how decisions are made. The
FERC recently announced rules for an alternative relicensing process
based on more negotiation between decision participants."' The licensee
now has the option to pursue a new license under an alternative licensing
108- In 1998, the FERC established an inter-agency task force to improve relationships and
coordination with federal resource agencies. The task force focused on a number ofissues including improving alternative licensing procedures, improving coordination, andidentifying options on how to analyze economic issues. While other areas of the taskforce have made specific recommendations, the draft report on economic analysis
contains only a list of practices and analytical tools used by the agencies. No changes inFERC analytical approach have occurred. See FERC, Joint Statement Commitment for
an Improved Hydropower Licensing Process (May 22, 2000), at http://www.ferc.
fed.us/newsl/agree.pdf.
109 This discussion focuses on whether the analytical approach to evaluation will change
rather than specific analytical techniques. For example, commitments to monetize
environmental services or a move to implement social benefit-cost analysis represent
significant departures from the FERC's current knee-of-the-curve approach and would
represent a change in analytical approach. This is contrasted with using different
analytical techniques within a knee-of-the-curve framework. For example, as power
markets develop, the FERC staff could rely on market power rates rather than
engineering cost estimates to calculate the costs of foregone power. In this case different
analytical techniques (market prices versus engineering costs) can be used within the
same analytical approach (knee-of-the-curve). This discussion should not imply that
changes in techniques would not have an impact on the outcomes of licensing decisions.Deregulation of the power markets may indirectly place more weight "on nature" in
relicensing decisions by lowering the price of power. For example, competition is likely
to drive down the cost of producing power from all sources. The costs of forgone power
may be much lower when calculating lost power benefits using market rates compared tothe cost of constructing replacement power. Ironically, it may be better power cost
analysis, and not introduction of benefit analysis, that increases the attractiveness of
environmental mitigation alternatives and dam decommissioning.I 10 See Moore, supra note 77, at 6-9.
IIISee FERC Alternative Procedures, 18 C.F.R. § 4.34(i) (2000). For a summary of thetwo relicensing processes, see National Hydropower Association, Relicensing
Hydroelectric Power Projects: A Handbook for People Involved In RelicensingHydropower Projects (Apr. 1999), at http://www.hydro.org/nha2.pdf.
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process, rather than the conventional FERC licensing process. The
alternative process involves negotiation with agency and environmental
interests and the dam operator over terms of the license. The presumption
is that if all interested parties to the negotiation can agree on a mutually
satisfactory license, the FERC will write these conditions in the license.
The dam operator is encouraged to work with this selected group of
stakeholders to identify relevant studies, mitigation alternatives, and
operating conditions, and ultimately to develop a mutually agreed-to
license application.' 12  Conceptually, it is the participants who must
develop common understandings about what is at stake, what issues are
most important to them, and which ones they will put on the table to reach
an agreement. As a practical matter, the alternative process seeks to
downplay the role of the FERC staff and analysis in judging whether a
mitigation alternative is "worth it." More of the responsibility of this
decision is now in the hands of the participants in the negotiation process.
Whether the FERC's alternative negotiation process has
substantially changed licensing outcomes or increased satisfaction with
licensing outcomes is still an open question. Experience with the
alternative process is still too recent and evolving." 3 The relative position
of "nature" in the outcome of this alternative process vis-ai-vis the
outcomes of the conventional process is unclear at this point.
Furthermore, how current and future legal challenges will alter the relative
power of the participants and alter the outcomes of the process is also
unknown.
However, the patterns that are emerging in the FERC relicensing
process, as well as broader patterns in the evaluation of water projects in
general, lead me to some tentative predictions. While the decision process
is changing toward more open and inclusive forms of bargaining and
negotiation, I do not believe the types of analysis generated will change
appreciably in these more open forums. I believe the alternative process
will continue to request and require cost analysis of lost power and
112 See Bonham, supra note 95, at 122-25.
113At least some initial experiences have been positive. See Larry LaBolle,
Collaborative Relicensing: Can It Work?, WATER POWER & DAM CONSTRUCTION, June
25, 1999, at 25; Steve Groves & Gary Liimatainen, Collaborative Relicensing: What's In
It For Me, The Hydro Owner?, Paper presented at the WaterPower '99 Conference, Las
Vegas, July 6-9, 1999; David J. Schwall, Science Based Approach to Outstanding
Resource Issues PaciflCorp's North Umpqua Project-Watershed Analysis Settlement
Process, Paper presented at the WaterPower '99 Conference (July 6-9, 1999); Bender,
supra note 24, at 218 n.159; Powell, supra note 79, at 406-10.
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mitigation alternatives and defensible environmental response analysis. 114
It is my belief that these two types of analyses are the most useful for
participants to understand the choices and options available to them. In
other words, I do not anticipate that benefit estimation procedures that
monetize the changes in nature's aquatic services-like nonmarket
valuation techniques-will be frequently requested or be pivotal
information during relicensing negotiations.
What is changing is who is getting to decide whether the additional
100 cfs and 1,000 salmon are worth sacrificing $100,000 in lost power. I
do not know how a more open process will change the relative importance
placed on nature in relicensing, but it is unlikely that the analytical
approach used to discover what is at stake will change appreciably.
Comprehensive benefit analysis presumes to weigh the environmental
consequences for the participants. Yet the decision participants will retain
their authority to weigh the environmental gains against the opportunity
costs and make the judgment of worth rather than rely on an analysis to
make the decision. Benefit analysis also makes an implicit assumption
that people require or need assistance in making choices in situations
where outcomes are measured in different units (increased power costs
versus more salmon and whooping cranes). The decision participants are
able to express the values they hold for particular environmental outcomes
in the alternative process and they do not necessarily need an analysis to
measure what their preferences are." 5 When making decisions about what
to do with scarce analytical resources, participants most likely will
continue to use analysis to discover and illuminate what is at stake (both in
terms of fish numbers, acres of habitat, lost power benefits) and convince
others that the analysis of changes in the ecosystem services is credible
and scientifically sound. This may include spending additional resources
reducing uncertainty surrounding environmental response analysis or
doing additional environmental response analysis. Economic studies may
be conducted to the extent that the changes in service flow are readily
reflected in observable market activities (recreational spending on a
fishery). If benefits are ever estimated for nonmarket services, it is likely
to be used as a legitimating function to support a preconceived position
rather than facilitating the negotiation through the discovery of
114 Environmental response analysis relates changes in management options (instream
flow, fish passage) to ecosystem responses (acres of new habitat, numbers of returning
fish, etc.).
115 Obviously, negotiation processes rely on participants to reflect the multitude ofinterests at stake. This simple observation in turn requires that negotiations are open and
capable of accommodating a wide range of affected interests.
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alternatives, the consequences of alternatives, or the evaluation of
alternatives. 116 In short, the decision process is changing but the analysis
(understood as a general approach) is not.17
Finally, the move towards a more open negotiation is not a
temporary change or experiment. While specific changes in the
relicensing process cannot be predicted, the move to more collaborative or
open negotiated deal making is unlikely to be reversed. This move toward
more acceptance and emphasis on open negotiation is a broad based
change in attitude and approach that transcends the relicensing process and
the FERC. Reflecting on a century of changes in the nation's water
program, Leonard Shabman argues that this shift from formal analytic
process to more negotiation-based ones is a dominant theme across most
water programs-water project planning, water allocation, and water
pollution regulations." 18 Shabman states:
In the past watershed deal making was disguised by a
pretense that decisions were directed by the objective
calculations and comparisons of costs with benefits.
Today, in a radical shift from the past, watershed
management programs openly call for collaborative
116 See generally Leonard Shabman, Bargaining, Analysis and Water Management, 116
WATER RESOURCES UPDATE, Mar. 2000, at 71. Morlan states that "until these methods
can produce more credible results, they will likely have little influence on policy, even
though the values people place on healthy environments may be very high." Morlan,
supra note 15, at 14.
An example may be illustrative. Currently, North Carolina Power is using the
alternative process in seeking new licenses at Roanoke Rapids power plant. The initial
applicant prepared environmental assessment did not include any economic studies that
monetized nonmarket environmental services. See North Carolina Power, FERC No.
2009 Roanoke Rapids and Gaston Hydropower Project Transmittal of Draft License
Application and Preliminary Draft Applicant Prepared Environmental Assessment (May
1998), at http://rimswebl .ferc.fed.us/rims.q?rp2-getimagepages-1853603-28--465-1-50.
The stakeholders and North Carolina Power have negotiated a series of supplemental
studies to be undertaken in addition to those contained in the applicant prepared EA (the
licensee pays for the studies). See id. Currently, studies that will be undertaken include
hydrologic modeling and biological response studies. See id. No studies that propose to
calculate the monetary values of these environmental outcomes have been proposed. See
id. For a list of studies, see NC Power's website, at http://www.ncpower.com/
hydrohome/FHRelicensing/RelicensingDocuments.htm. See generally Schwall, supra
note 113.
118 See Shabman, supra note 116.
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decision making (bargaining and negotiation) to guide
watershed restoration decisions. 119
Debate will continue about how this negotiation should be structured and
about the relative power and position of participants in the process, but the
broad acceptance of negotiation as a way to reach decisions is unlikely to
change in the near future.
Finally, much of the current tension in the relicensing process is
caused by fundamentally different value systems about the way rivers
should be used. Negotiation and bargaining-regardless of whether it
ends in a consensus or with the exercise of power-will be the process
used to sort out conflicting values and ends. Analysis may help
illuminate, but cannot resolve, this debate. 20
It would be incorrect, however, to imply that the current alternative
relicensing process is capable of sorting out these conflicting values and
ends in all relicensing cases. A significant underlying source of tension
underlying the dam relicensing decision is the dam decommissioning/dam
removal issue. Given current legal circumstances, I believe the potential
of the alternative relicensing process is quite limited in cases where dam
decommissioning (dam removal) is a serious alternative under
consideration.
A consensus negotiation process, like the alternative process, is
able to reach a decision if there are well-understood and accepted rules
that govern the process and define the rights and duties of the participants
in that process. All participants must have something to gain or lose in the
process, otherwise there is nothing to discuss. Finally, the process should
be inclusive in the sense that all parties with an interest in the outcome
should be represented. While decision participants may chafe under the
current legal and judicial rules, conditions for effective negotiations can
exist in many relicensing cases where there is a general agreement that the
license will be reissued. In the context of deciding whether a dam should
be decommissioned or removed, however, conditions necessary for the
collaborative process do not currently exist. In fact, it will be difficult for
any FERC-level decision process (the conventional analytic process or the
alternative process) to resolve the issue of dam decommissioning and
removal given the existing legal environment.
119 Id. at 72.
120 See generally Ingram & Schneider, supra note 65.
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Currently, the FERC claims to have the authority to authorize
decommissioning and make the licensee pay the costs of dam removal.
121
The legality of this claim is hotly challenged by the hydropower industry
and has not been clarified in the courts or in statutes.1 2 While the FERC
claims this authority, it also claims that it will exercise it in only rare
cases. 123 In the midst of a fierce debate over whether the FERC can and
should order decommissioning, the question of who pays remains an
unanswered question. Environmental groups assert that the licensee or
industry should pay for removal.124 Industry argues that the FERC does
not have the authority to order and make the licensee pay for dam
removal.125 Given these conditions, there is no reason for a dam operator
to enter into a negotiation over the removal of a dam because there is
nothing to gain from such a decision. The now famous Edwards Dam in
Maine was the only involuntary decommissioning the FERC has ever
ordered. 26  The two dams on the Elwha River in Washington State are
also being removed due, in part, to FERC leanings in that direction.' 27 In
both the Elwha and Edwards cases, the licensee only conceded to dam
removal when someone else-the general taxpayer or another party who
was not a party to the negotiation-paid the costs for removal.1
28
121 See FERC Project Decommissioning at Relicensing, 18 C.F.R. § 2.24 (2000).
122 See generally Michael A. Swiger et al., Paying for the Change: Can the FERC Force
Dam Decommissioning at Relicensing?, 17 ENERGY L.J. 164 (1996); Bryant, supra note
68 at 106.
123 See FERC Project Decommissioning at Relicensing, 18 C.F.R. § 2.24 (2000).
124 See Hydropower Reform Coalition, supra note 97.
125 See Swiger, supra note 122, at 166-168; Tina Davis, FERC Reiterates Authority to
Order Dam Removal, 28 ENERGY DAILY, June 1, 2000.
126 See Blaine Harden, US. Orders Maine Dam Destroyed, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1997,
at Al; Sensiba, supra note 71, at 606.
127 See generally Bender, supra note 24, at 219-31.
128 In the Edwards case, after threatening legal action, the licensee transferred ownership
of the facility to the State of Maine. The $7 million dam removal is being paid for by the
Bath Iron Works (shipbuilder) and Kennebec Hydro Developers Group (a coalition of
dam operators). In exchange for their contribution to the dam removal, Bath Iron Works
received permission to expand its shipyard by fifteen acres into the Kennebec River and
the dam operators received postponements for up to fifteen years for installation of
upstream fish passage requirements. See Bryant, supra note 68, at 109-12; see also John
McPhee, Farewell to the Nineteenth Century, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 1999 at 44,
48. In the Elwha case, the licensee agreed to give up legal challenges when Congress
passed the Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-495,
106 Stat. 3173 (1992). The law allowed the federal government to purchase the dams for
$29.5 million from the licensee. See id.
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Until the extreme uncertainty over legal rules and financial
obligations is reduced, it will be impossible to fashion a workable day-to-
day decision process of any kind with respect to dam removal. Political
negotiations of another kind and at a higher policy level than FERC(statutory or judicial) will be necessary to fashion a workable decision
process capable of addressing dam decommissioning and removal. If this
is not forthcoming, expect more protracted legal battles and cost shifting
to parties not involved in the relicensing process to make dam removal
happen.
